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Abstract: In a recently published article in the prestigious journal Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Navin A. Bapat uses a rationalist approach to explain key bargaining processes related to the 
Afghanistan conflict, concluding that “the Afghan mission may continue for political reasons
until it is impossible to sustain militarily.” The article captures the essence of the strategic 
situation in Afghanistan: the losing dynamic involved. This brief commentary in response is 
an attempt to shed light on where the tenets of Bapat’s game-theoretic model may be 
erroneous, even while the model does produce conclusions that appear valid overall.
There is not much to take issue with as to the ultimate conclusion of Navin A. Bapat’s article, 
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge (Foreign Policy Analysis 6, 2010, 217-236). 
Afghanistan will indeed matter for the long run as one of the key geographical sources of a 
national security threat for the United States and even to a number of other NATO countries. 
Jihadist groups can gain useful safe haven there to organize, plan and train for attacks on 
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these countries, while simultaneously they can also continue propaganda and recruitment 
efforts directed at Muslim populations worldwide.
The assumptions that Karzai’s legitimacy and general hold on Afghanistan are
diminishing with the status quo, or that the Taliban are gaining strength would also be hard to 
challenge. Audience costs can indeed be imposed on the Obama administration should it 
seriously consider drawing down U.S. troop numbers to critically low levels post-2011;
although it may be important to note that for the moment such audience costs cannot with 
similar confidence be anticipated in the cases of important allies such as the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, Canada or Germany. Finally, the author’s references to a moral hazard with 
regards to Karzai’s government may resonate especially well with the mainstream Western 
discourse of late which tends to consider moral hazard in a much wider sense when it comes 
to the current Afghan leadership and the government institutions it ought to control.
At the same time, it is welcome to see a Rational Actor Model and bargaining theory 
applied to strategically interpret the Afghan conflict, given the abundance of sources willing 
to explain away the actual complexities of it with Orientalizing references to tribes, 
Pashtunwali, irrational irreconcilability, and neopatrimonial cleptocracy. Navin A. Bapat’s
article comes as welcome relief in this respect, with some important caveats. These points of
criticism are to be discussed in the following section.
Re-framing on three plus one counts
The fundamentally correct theses and the appealing features of the approach notwithstanding,
on several counts the article’s thesis rests on flawed premises that undermine the game-
theoretic modeling of the policy dilemmas involved, no matter how consistent the 
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argumentation was, and no matter that it does seem to offer workable conclusions. The most 
fundamental objections can be summed up in three points regarding the basic assumptions of 
the model, with one more added regarding the overall rationalizing approach.
Firstly, the variable CT, that is, the costs of fighting for the Taliban, discussed in the 
article as an important unknown, is partly borne by O: the Obama administration itself. This is 
no conspiracy or grand deception on the part of O, it is merely a matter of unwanted fact, 
inherited from B, that is, the Bush administration which could not do much about this, either. 
Over a long period, consecutive U.S. administrations provided lavish support to the Pakistani 
military. Post-2001, some of this assistance was granted nominally to compensate Pakistan for
costs is had to suffer in the war on terrorism, but also, in reality, to pay for access to the 
Afghan theatre where operations would not be possible without Pakistani acquiescence – the 
only alternative being a war on nuclear-armed Pakistan, or radically different, trustful 
relations with Iran and/or Russia. Relying on conservative assessments of Pakistan’s dual role 
in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, regarding which evidence exists in various forms,2 one 
needs to consider at least the possibility that elements within the Pakistan Army, and its 
intelligence service, ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), derail some of the funds provided by the 
U.S., and thus pay, for example, for the millions of rounds of small arms ammunition fired by 
insurgents in Afghanistan every year. This self-evidently pertains to the tenets of Bapat’s 
model. P’s (Pakistan’s) and its elements’ (P1 and P2’s) payoffs ought to be conceptualized, 
and O’s unintended assistance to P2 ought to alter the model and some of the perceived-
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probability functions it is built on. In fact, writing in an earlier piece Bapat does appreciate the 
enormously important impact Pakistan’s behavior has on the strategic situation (Bapat 2009).
Secondly, and this concerns perceived probability functions of T: B and O, that is, the 
Bush and the Obama administrations, continuously and anti-strategically misrepresented T’s 
probability of winning. Foreign policy behavior (FPB) is ultimately different from intended 
foreign policy (FP), and any such FPB/FP discrepancy can be interpreted as an important 
signal by adversaries. When T’s insurgency began to strengthen post-2001, the response of 
the U.S. and other countries involved in Afghanistan was not trying to wipe it out, as Bapat 
contends. Resources for this were never sufficiently available. Only a creeping commitment 
was made, with gradually increasing troop numbers, that lagged behind developments in the 
insurgency’s spread and the evolution of its tactics. In the end, the U.S./Western response to 
T’s growing challenge amounted to no more than reactive efforts to contain it. Furthermore, 
the Iraq war drew away important resources from Afghanistan even as T’s challenge was 
already on. U.S. financing for military operations in Afghanistan fell back in absolute terms 
twice post-2001 (see Belasco 2010:3 for data). First in 2003, because of the invasion of Iraq, 
and then in 2006, because of the deterioration of the situation there. Meanwhile, as late as in 
the autumn of 2005, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon’s leadership were
seriously and openly considering drawing down U.S. troop numbers in Afghanistan (Schmitt 
2005). FPB/FP discrepancy also played a role from the part of other members of the ISAF 
coalition. In spite of the generally voiced grandiose statements about Afghanistan’s future, 
including the Afghanistan Compact of early 2006 which committed the international 
community to “promoting” security in all of Afghanistan by end-2010 (AC 2006:6), even the 
major contributors of troops and assistance such as the Netherlands and Canada were 
constantly indicating a desire to withdraw their troops in a few years’ time. As originally
conceived, the formal termination of their non-training-related military commitments was 
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expected by August 2008 and February 2009, respectively, and with no likely substitutes 
other than the U.S. to fill in for them, this signaled fundamental weakness to T. No wonder 
that then-military-commander of T, Mullah Dadullah, saw the southern Afghan provinces of 
Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kandahar, taken over by ISAF in its Stage-3 expansion in August 
2006, as the gateway through which his “mujahedeen” should victoriously march to take 
Afghanistan (Al-Jazeera 2007). Finally, O’s announcement of the surge in late 2009, after 
much spectacular hesitation, came with the caveat that this surge will end and even be 
reversed in the foreseeable future. The U.S. military’s informally leaked need of 80,000 
additional troops (Lakes 2009) was never seriously put on the agenda in the White House, and 
President Obama even set the end-date of the surged troop presence to earlier than the 
Pentagon wished (Baker 2009). Since then, the end dates of the Netherlands’, Canada’s and 
the United Kingdom’s involvement came to be more clearly determined as well (the 
Netherland’s withdrawal began in August 2010, and is slated to be completed by December).
This is not lost on T, or on P2 for that matter.
Thirdly, pertaining to the end-games Bapat considers, power is already shared with 
“T”. But here one has to be much more precise. If T is interpreted as all of the Islamist 
insurgent factions operating in Afghanistan, it includes many more than just the Taliban. 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hisb-i-Islami and Jalaluddin Haqqani’s group come to mind as prime 
fellow-travelers of the Taliban movement. While nominally they look to Mullah Omar, the 
leader of the Taliban, as amir-ul-momineen (leader of the faithful) for the entire insurgency, 
their relations run much deeper directly with Pakistan, for which it is a long-running 
aspiration to turn the Taliban into a loyal strategic proxy west of the Durand Line.3 To come 
to any agreement with the broader T, separate-track negotiations with these groups are not 
avoidable. Thinking past 2011: for Karzai’s survival such negotiations are not avoidable, 
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either. And talks have already occurred. Meanwhile Islamists,4 as well as even Hisb-i-Islami-
affiliated ministers, were present in Hamed Karzai’s cabinet post-2004, and in the Afghan 
parliament as elected members in the Wolesi Jirga (lower house), or as appointed members of
the Meshrano Jirga (upper house). Karzai regularly appointed Hisb-i-Islami-affiliated 
provincial governors to the head of northern provinces over the years, seeking to 
counterbalance the strength and influence of various elements of the late Northern Alliance 
there (Foschini 2010). The most controversial are Karzai’s unconfirmed talks with the 
Haqqani faction. Given this group’s especially deep ties to al-Qaida, not so much O in 
general, but the U.S. military rather, and COMISAF General Petraeus in particular, voiced 
major discomfort with the idea of talks with the Haqqanis, let alone with the idea of any 
openly presented power-sharing or amnesty agreement with them down the road. For just this 
reason, the U.S. military and Gen. Petraeus voiced support for including the Haqqani group 
on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations (Dawn 2010). The example illustrates 
how it is not at all clear, as Bapat posits already in the abstract of his article, that “Karzai 
recognizes that negotiation will allow the Obama Administration to exit the conflict.” This is 
something O cannot comfortably recognize. Meanwhile, Karzai is increasingly involved in an 
intense web of regional (and even further-reaching) diplomacy, an aim of which may be to 
make a negotiated outcome acceptable and sustainable for him.
Finally, the one overall downside regarding the choice of a Rational Actor Model is 
that its unitary-actor assumption is misleading in important ways. Not only is this relevant 
with regards to T, or P, or, for that matter, to Karzai and his current circle of allies, but most 
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importantly it fails to account for important aspects of U.S. decision-making. With intense 
debates within the Obama administration, a Congress wary about corruption in Afghanistan 
and the therefore questionable utility of U.S. assistance to the Karzai government, federal 
agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) single-mindedly pursuing their 
organizational prerogatives on the ground, regardless of the strategic context, all at a time 
when the possible incompatibility of various coalition efforts (counterinsurgency, 
counterterrorism, counternarcotics most notably) raises serious concerns, concepts as old as 
Allison’s Organizational Process Paradigm, or the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm (1969), 
come to mind as self-evidently useful and even inevitably required tools for understanding the 
policies pursued and the outcomes attained in Afghanistan.
Why the conclusions hold
These points of criticism may be relevant even with the understanding that the parsimony of 
Bapat’s model in his hereby discussed article could (although it does not) serve to reflect not 
reality as such, but its representation in between the earlobes, in President Obama’s mind. As 
the New York Times reported about Obama’s decision to surge troop levels before pulling 
down troop numbers: “some of the most intensive discussion focused on the country where 
Mr. Obama could send no troops — Pakistan” (Baker 2009). This shows that the objections 
concerning Pakistan’s role above ought to have their impact on the equations considered.
That the model still produces conclusions that seem valid is because the above 
reservations do not fundamentally alter the losing dynamic captured by it. A U.S. 
administration unable to integrate its own efforts in furtherance of an only nominally existing 
comprehensive approach; a Taliban growing on U.S. involvement as a perverse outcome of 
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policies pursued physically through Pakistan; and an Afghan government that may try to 
secure its survival by itself courting Islamists more than before; these all work to reinforce 
such a dynamic. Bapat’s claim elsewhere (2009), that the U.S. “is boxed in” in Afghanistan, is 
therefore valid.
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